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THE STRENGTH OF COUNTABLE SATURATION
BENNO VAN DEN BERG1, EYVIND BRISEID2, AND PAVOL SAFARIK3
Abstract. We determine the proof-theoretic strength of the principle of countable satu-
ration in the context of the systems for nonstandard arithmetic introduced in our earlier
work.
1. Introduction
In [4] we introduced two systems for nonstandard analysis, one based on classical logic and
one on intuitionistic logic. Our aim was to have systems in which one can formalise large parts
of nonstandard analysis, which are conservative over well-established standard systems and
which allow one to extract computational information from nonstandard proofs.
We analysed various nonstandard principles, but an important principle which we did not
discuss in any great detail was the principle of countable saturation:
CSAT: ∀stn0 ∃xσ Φ(n, x)→ ∃f0→σ ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)).
One reason why this principle is important is that it is involved in the construction of Loeb
measures, an often used technique in nonstandard analysis. What we did say is that the
principle can be proved in the intuitionistic system introduced in [4], while it adds greatly to
the proof-theoretic strength of the classical system. The purpose of this short paper is to prove
the first claim and to show that the addition of countable saturation to our classical system
gives it the proof-theoretic strength of full second-order arithmetic. To show the latter we
will give an interpretation of full second-order arithmetic in our classical system extended with
countable saturation and rely on earlier work of Escardo´ and Oliva [7] to interpret countable
saturation using Spector’s bar recursion.
2. Formalities
In this paper we will work with extensions of the system E-HAω of extensional Heyting
arithmetic in all finite types. There are several variants of this system differing, for example,
in the way they treat equality. For our purposes decidability of the atomic formulas is not
important, so in this respect all variants are equally good. But for the reader who would like to
see things fixed we could say we work with a version in which only equality of natural numbers
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2 THE STRENGTH OF COUNTABLE SATURATION
is primitive and equality at higher types is defined extensionally. Also, we could have product
types as a primitive notion or not; both options have their advantages and disadvantages, but
for us it turns out to be more convenient to not have them as a primitive notion, so that we
end up with the system E-HAω as formalised in [11, Section 3.3] (this is the system called
E-HA
ω
0 in [15] and E-HA
ω
→ in [16]). The price we have to pay, however, is that we often end
up working with tuples of terms and variables of different types and we will have to adopt
some conventions for how these ought to be handled. Fortunately, there are some standard
conventions here which we will follow (see [11, 15] or [4]).
What will be important for us, is that E-HAω is able to handle finite sequences of objects
of the same type (not to be confused with the metalinguistic notion of tuple from the previous
paragraph). There are at least two ways of doing this: we could extend E-HAω with types σ∗ for
finite sequences of objects of type σ, add constants for the empty sequence and the operation
of prepending an element to a finite sequence, as well as a list recursor satisfying the expected
equations (as in [4]). Alternatively, we could exploit the fact that one can code finite sequences
of objects of type σ as a single object of type σ in such a way that every object of type σ codes a
finite sequence (as in [3]). Moreover, the standard operations on sequences (such as extracting
their length or concatenating them) are given by terms in Go¨del’s T . For the purposes of this
paper, it does not really matter what we do. But whether it is a genuine new type or just
syntactic sugar, we will use the notation σ∗ for finite sequences of objects of type σ.
In fact, for us finite sequences are really stand-ins for finite sets. For this reason we will often
use set-theoretic notation, such as ∅ for the empty sequence, ∪ for concatenation and {x} for
the finite sequence of length 1 whose sole component is x. And for x of type σ and y of type
σ∗ we will write x ∈ y if x equals one of the components of the sequence y.
It remains to define the system E-HAωst from [4]. The language of E-HA
ω
st is obtained from
that of E-HAω by adding unary predicates stσ as well as two new quantifiers ∀stxσ and ∃stxσ for
every type σ ∈ T . Formulas in the old language of E-HAω (so those not containing these new
symbols) we will call internal ; in contrast, general formulas from E-HAωst will be called external.
We will adopt the following
Important convention: We follow Nelson [13] in using small Greek letters
to denote internal formulas and capital Greek letters to denote formulas which
can be external.
The system E-HAωst is obtained by adding to E-HA
ω the axioms EQ, Tst and IA
st , where
• EQ stands for the defining axioms of the external quantifiers:
∀stxΦ(x) ↔ ∀x ( st(x)→ Φ(x) ),
∃stxΦ(x) ↔ ∃x ( st(x) ∧ Φ(x) ).
• Tst consists of:
(1) the axioms st(x) ∧ x = y → st(y),
(2) the axiom st(t) for each closed term t in T ,
(3) the axioms st(f) ∧ st(x)→ st(fx).
• IAst is the external induction axiom:
IA
st :
(
Φ(0) ∧ ∀stx0(Φ(x) → Φ(x+ 1))
)
→ ∀stx0Φ(x).
In EQ and IAst , the expression Φ(x) is an arbitrary external formula in the language of E-HAωst,
possibly with additional free variables. Besides external induction in the form of IAst , the
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system E-HAωst also contains the internal induction axiom
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x0 (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x + 1) )→ ∀x0 ϕ(x),
simply because this is part of E-HAω. But here it is to be understood that this principle applies
to internal formulas only. Of course, the laws of intuitionistic logic apply to all formulas of
E-HA
ω
st.
It is easy to see that E-HAωst is a conservative extension of E-HA
ω: one gets an interpretation
of E-HAωst in E-HA
ω by declaring everything to be standard. For more information on E-HAωst,
we refer to [4].
3. Countable saturation is weak, intuitionistically
The purpose of this section is to show that CSAT does not increase the proof-theoretic
strength of the intuitionistic systems for nonstandard arithmetic considered in [4]. Our main
tool for showing this is the Dst -interpretation from [4]. We recall its salient features.
The Dst -interpretation associates to every formula Φ(a) in the language of E-HA
ω
st a new
formula
Φ(a)Dst :≡ ∃stx ∀sty ϕDst (x, y, a)
where all variables in the tuple x are of sequence type. We do this by induction on the structure
of Φ(a). If Φ(a) is an atomic formula, then we put
(i) ϕ(a)Dst :≡ ϕDst (a):≡ ϕ(a) if Φ(a) is internal atomic formula ϕ(a),
(ii) stσ(uσ)Dst :≡ ∃stxσ
∗
u ∈σ x.
If Φ(a)Dst ≡ ∃stx∀sty ϕDst (x, y, a) and Ψ(b)
Dst ≡ ∃stu∀stv ψDst (u, v, b), then
(iii) (Φ(a) ∧Ψ(b))Dst :≡ ∃stx, u∀sty, v
(
ϕDst (x, y, a) ∧ ψDst (u, v, b)
)
,
(iv) (Φ(a) ∨Ψ(b))Dst :≡ ∃stx, u∀sty, v
(
ϕDst (x, y, a) ∨ ψDst (u, v, b)
)
,
(v) (Φ(a)→ Ψ(b))Dst :≡ ∃stU, Y ∀stx, v
(
∀y ∈ Y [x, v]ϕDst (x, y, a)→ ψDst (U [x], v, b)
)
.
In the last line we have used Y [x] as an abbreviation for
Y [x]: =
⋃
y∈Y
y(x).
This can be regarded as a new application operation, whose associated λ-abstraction is given
by
Λx.t(x): = {λx.t(x)}
(for then (Λx.t(x))[s] = t(s)).
It remains to consider the quantifiers. For that, assume Φ(z, a)Dst ≡ ∃stx∀sty ϕDst (x, y, z, a),
with the free variable z not occuring among the a. Then
(vi) (∀zΦ(z, a))Dst :≡ ∃stx∀sty∀z ϕDst (x, y, z, a),
(vii) (∃zΦ(z, a))Dst :≡ ∃stx∀sty∃z∀y′ ∈ y ϕDst (x, y
′, z, a),
(viii) (∀stzΦ(z, a))Dst :≡ ∃stX∀stz, y ϕDst (X [z], y, z, a),
(ix) (∃stzΦ(z, a))Dst :≡ ∃stx, z ∀sty ∃z′ ∈ z ∀y′ ∈ y ϕDst (x, y
′, z′, a).
We will write H for E-HAωst together with the schema Φ↔ Φ
Dst , where Φ can be any external
formula.
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Remark 3.1. Alternatively, we could define H as
H: = E-HAωst + I+ NCR+ HAC+ HIP∀st + HGMP
st.
See [4] for a definition of these principles and a proof of this fact.
The main result of [4] on H and the Dst -interpretation was:
Theorem 3.2. If H ⊢ Φ and
ΦDst :≡ ∃stx∀sty ϕDst (x, y),
then there is a sequence t of terms from Go¨del’s T such that
E-HA
ω ⊢ ∀y ϕD(t, y).
Since ϕDst ≡ ϕ for internal ϕ, this implies that H is a conservative extension of E-HAω.
The aim of this section is to prove that H ⊢ CSAT. Before we can do that, we first need to
observe that E-HAω proves a version of the “finite axiom of choice”.
Lemma 3.3. E-HAω proves that
∀s0
∗ (
∀n ∈ s ∃xσ ψ(n, x)→ ∃f0→σ ∀n ∈ s ψ(n, f(n))
)
.
Proof. By induction on the length |s| of the sequence s. Assume ∀n ∈ s ∃xσ ψ(n, x).
(1) If |s| = 0, then any function f will do.
(2) If |s| = k+1, then write si for the ith component of s (where s0 is the first and sk is the
last) and t = 〈s0, . . . , sk−1〉 for the sequence obtained from s by deleting the last entry.
By induction hypothesis, there is a function f0 such that ∀n ∈ t ψ(n, f0(n)). There are
two possibilities:
(a) There is j < k such that sk = sj . Then f0 also works for s.
(b) For all j < k we have sk 6= sj. Then choose x0 such that ψ(sk, x0) and let
f(n) =
{
x0 if n = sk,
f0(n) else.

Note that the use of the decidability of equality of objects of type 0 in the previous lemma
was necessary in view of the following observation:
Lemma 3.4. In E-HAω the finite axiom of choice for sequences of objects of type σ
∀sσ
∗ (
∀x ∈ s ∃yτ ψ(x, y)→ ∃fσ→τ ∀x ∈ s ψ(x, f(x))
)
is equivalent to the decidability of the equality of objects of type σ.
Proof. If the equality of objects of type σ is decidable, then the finite axiom of choice for
sequences of objects of type σ can be argued for as in Lemma 3.3. Conversely, suppose that
this finite axiom of choice holds and let a and b be two objects of type σ and s be the sequence
〈a, b〉. Then ∀x ∈ s ∃n0 (x = sn), so by the finite axiom of choice we have a function f :σ → 0
such that
∀x ∈ s x = sf(x).
We can now decide whether f(a) and f(b) are equal or not, as these are natural numbers.
If f(a) 6= f(b), then a and b cannot be equal. If, on the other hand, f(a) = f(b), then
a = sf(a) = sf(b) = b. 
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Theorem 3.5. The theory H proves CSAT.
Proof. Recall
CSAT ≡ ∀stn0 ∃xσ Φ(n, x)→ ∃f0→σ ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)).
So suppose (
Φ(n, x)
)Dst
≡ ∃stu ∀stv ϕ(u, v, n, x).
Then (
∀stn0 ∃xΦ(n, x)
)Dst
≡ ∃stU ∀stn0, w ∃x∀v ∈ wϕ(U [n], v, n, x)
and (
∃f ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n))
)Dst
≡ ∃stU˜ ∀sts, w˜ ∃f ∀n˜0 ∈ s, v˜ ∈ w˜ ϕ(U˜ [n˜], v˜, n˜, f(n˜)),
so CSATDst is
∃stU˜ , N,W ∀stU, s, w˜(
∀n0 ∈ N [U, s, w˜] ∀w ∈ W [U, s, w˜] ∃x∀v ∈ wϕ(U [n], v, n, x)→
∃f ∀n˜0 ∈ s, v˜ ∈ w˜ ϕ(U˜ [U, n˜], v˜, n˜, f(n˜))
)
.
So if we put
U˜ : = ΛU, n˜ . U [n˜],
N : = ΛU, s, v˜ . s,
W : = ΛU, s, w˜ . {w˜},
then we have to show that E-HAω proves
∀n0 ∈ s ∃x∀v ∈ w˜ ϕ(U [n], v, n, x)→ ∃f ∀n˜0 ∈ s, v˜ ∈ w˜ ϕ(U [n˜], v˜, n˜, f(n˜)).
But this is an instance of the finite axiom of choice (for ψ(n0, x): = ∀v ∈ w˜ ϕ(U [n], v, n, x)), so
this follows from Lemma 3.3. 
4. Countable saturation is strong, classically
From now on we will only work with classical systems. So let E-PAω be E-HAω together with
the law of excluded middle and E-PAωst be E-HA
ω
st together with the law of excluded middle.
The aim of this section is to show that, in contrast to what happens in the intuitionistic
case, the principle CSAT in combination with nonstandard principles is very strong in a classical
setting. In fact, we need only a simple of form of overspill
OS0: ∀
stx0 ϕ(x) → ∃x0 (¬ st(x) ∧ ϕ(x) )
in combination with “CSAT for numbers”
CSAT0: ∀
stn0 ∃x0 Φ(n, x)→ ∃f0→0 ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)).
to obtain a theory which has at least the strength of second-order arithmetic (in the next section
we will show that this lower bound is sharp). More precisely, we have:
Theorem 4.1. The theory E-PAωst + OS0 + CSAT0 interprets full second-order arithmetic.
Proof. For convenience, let us write PA2 for full second-order classical arithmetic. The idea is
to interpret the natural numbers in PA2 as standard natural numbers in E-PA
ω
st and the subsets
of N in PA2 as arbitrary (possibly nonstandard) elements of type 0
∗ in E-PAωst, where n ∈ s is
interpreted as: n equals one of the entries of the sequence s (as before). Now:
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(1) E-PAωst is a classical system, hence classical logic is interpreted.
(2) The Peano axioms for standard natural numbers are part of E-PAωst, so these are inter-
preted as well.
(3) Full induction is interpreted, because E-PAωst includes the external induction axiom.
(4) So it remains to verify full comprehension. For that it suffices to check that for every
formula Φ(n0) in the language of E-PAωst there is a sequence s
0∗ such that
∀stn
(
n ∈ s↔ Φ(n)
)
.
First of all, note that we have
∀stn ∃k ( k = 0↔ Φ(n) )
by classical logic, so by CSAT0 there is a function f
0→0 such that
∀stn ( f(n) = 0↔ Φ(n) ).
It follows easily by external induction that
∀stk0 ∃s0
∗
∀n ≤ k (n ∈ s↔ f(n) = 0 ),
so OS0 gives us a sequence s such that for any standard n we have
n ∈ s↔ f(n) = 0↔ Φ(n),
as desired.

Remark 4.2. From the discussion in Chapter 4 of [12] it seems that E-PAωst + OS0 + CSAT0
is a suitable framework for developing Nelson’s “radically elementary probability theory”. In
this connection it is interesting to observe that theorems using CSAT0, which Nelson calls “the
sequence principle”, are starred in [12], while in [8] the sequence principle is dropped altogether.
Proof-theoretically this makes a lot of sense, because while E-PAωst + OS0 is conservative over
E-PA
ω (see Theorem 5.1 below), the system E-PAωst + OS0 + CSAT0 has the strength of full
second-order arithmetic.
5. The classical strength of countable saturation
From now on we will work in E-PAωst extended with the principles
I : ∀stx′ ∃y ∀x ∈ x′ ϕ(x, y)→ ∃y ∀stxϕ(x, y) and
HACint : ∀
stx∃sty ϕ(x, y)→ ∃stF ∀stx∃y ∈ F (x)ϕ(x, y).
For convenience we will abbreviate this theory as P. Note that I implies OS0 (see [4, Proposi-
tion 3.3]), so P ⊢ OS0. The following theorem summarises the most important facts that we
established about P in [4]:
Theorem 5.1. To any formula Φ in the language of E-PAωst one can associate one of the form
ΦSst :≡ ∀stx∃sty ϕS(x, y),
in such a way that the following hold:
(1) Φ and ΦSst are provably equivalent in P.
(2) Whenever Φ is provable in P, there are terms t in Go¨del’s T such that
E-PA
ω ⊢ ∀x∃y ∈ t(x)ϕS(x, y).
(3) ϕSst ≡ ϕ for internal formulas ϕ.
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Hence P is a conservative extension of E-PAω.
The aim of this section is to prove that the strength of P extended with CSAT is precisely
that of full second-order arithmetic. As we have already shown that P extended with CSAT
has at least the strength of full second-order arithmetic, it suffices to show that P+ CSAT can
be interpreted in a system which has the strength of full second-order arithmetic. We do this
by showing that the Sst -interpretation of CSAT can be witnessed using Spector’s bar recursion
[14], which has the strength of full second-order arithmetic [1, p. 370]. In fact, recent work by
Escardo´ and Oliva [7] has shown that the Sst -interpretation of
AC
st
0 : ∀
stn0 ∃stxσ Φ(n, x) → ∃stf0→σ ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n))
can be interpreted using bar recursion. So the following argument, which resembles that in
Section 5 in [13], suffices to establish that P + CSAT has the strength of full second-order
arithmetic:
Theorem 5.2. P ⊢ ACst0 → CSAT.
Proof. We work in P+ ACst0 and have to show that
∀stn0 ∃xσ Φ(n, x)→ ∃f0→σ ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)).
In view of Theorem 5.1 it suffices to show this in case Φ(n, x) is of the form ∀stu∃stv φ(u, v, n, x).
To keep the notation simple we will ignore tuples and write simply u and v. So, in short, it
suffices to show that
∀stn0 ∃x∀stu ∃stv ϕ(u, v, n, x)(1)
implies
∃f ∀stn0 ∀stu ∃stv ϕ(u, v, n, f(n)).(2)
By HACint we get that (1) implies
∀stn0 ∃x∃stV ∀stu ∃v ∈ V (u)ϕ(u, v, n, x),
which is logically equivalent to
∀stn0 ∃stV ∃x∀stu ∃v ∈ V (u)ϕ(u, v, n, x),
which by ACst0 implies that
∃stV ∀stn0 ∃x∀stu ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, x).(1′)
On the other hand, (2) follows from
∃f ∃stV ∀stn0, u ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, f(n)),
which logically equivalent to
∃stV ∃f ∀stn0, u ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, f(n)).
By I, this follows from
(2′) ∃stV ∀sts0
∗
, t ∃f ∀n ∈ s, u ∈ t ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, f(n)).
Hence it suffices to show that (1′) implies (2′).
Now to do so, let some standard V satisfy (1′), so that we have
∀stn0 ∃x∀stu ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, x),(3)
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and fix arbitrary but standard s0
∗
and t. From (3) and the fact that the components of a
standard finite sequence are again standard (see [4, Lemma 2.11]) it follows that
∀n ∈ s ∃x∀u ∈ t ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, x)
which by Lemma 3.3 implies that
∃f ∀n ∈ s, u ∈ t ∃v ∈ V (n, u)ϕ(u, v, n, f(n)),
as desired. 
Remark 5.3. In [3] it is shown that the principle that we obtain by restricting ACst0 to internal
formulas only
AC
int
0 : ∀
stn0 ∃stxσ ϕ(n, x)→ ∃stf0→σ ∀stn0 ϕ(n, fn)
can be interpreted using a weak form of bar recursion (for binary trees). In the presence of this
principle the implication in the previous theorem can be reversed, that is:
Proposition 5.4. P ⊢ CSAT ∧ ACint0 → AC
st
0 .
Proof. We work in P+ CSAT+ ACint0 and need to prove
∀stn0 ∃stxσ Φ(n, x) → ∃stf0→σ ∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)).
So assume ∀stn0 ∃stxσ Φ(n, x), or, in other words,
∀stn0 ∃xσ ( st(x) ∧ Φ(n, x) ).
Then it follows from CSAT that there is a (not necessarily standard) function g: 0 → σ such
that
(4) ∀stn0 ( st(g(n)) ∧ Φ(n, g(n)) ).
In particular,
∀stn0 ∃stxσ (x = g(n) ),
so by ACint0 there is a standard function f : 0→ σ such that
∀stn0 f(n) = g(n).
But then it follows from (4) that
∀stn0Φ(n, f(n)),
as desired. 
So, over P, the principle ACst0 is equivalent to the conjunction of AC
int
0 and CSAT.
Remark 5.5. We have shown that P + CSAT can be interpreted in E-PAω + BR, where BR
stands for Spector’s bar recursion, which has the strength of second-order arithmetic. We could
also add countable choice
∀n0 ∃σxϕ(n, x)→ ∃F 0→σ ∀n0 ϕ(n, F (n))
to the interpreting system and still get a system with the strength of second-order arithmetic.
If we do this, we can also interpret transfer with numerical parameters, by which we mean
NP-TP∀ : ∀
stt (∀stxϕ(x, t)→ ∀xϕ(x, t) ),
where the only free variables which are allowed to occur in ϕ are x and t, and all variables in t
are of type 0. (See Theorem 5 and Remark 6 in [5].) This strengthens earlier results from [9].
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6. Conclusion
We have shown that countable saturation is a weak principle in the intuitionistic context, and
is even provable in the intuitionistic nonstandard system we introduced in [4]. It does however
add considerably to the strength of the classical systems we considered there. Indeed, by making
heavy use of earlier work of Escardo´ and Oliva we could calibrate its precise strength as that
of full second-order arithmetic. This confirms a pattern first observed by Henson, Kaufmann
and Keisler [9]: also in their work countable saturation had the effect of making their systems,
which originally had the strength of arithmetic, as strong as full second-order arithmetic. Their
work in [10] also suggests that the full saturation principle
SAT:≡ ∀stxσ ∃yτ Φ(x, y)→ ∃fσ→τ ∀stxσ Φ(x, f(x))
should make the classical systems we considered as strong as full higher-order arithmetic. It
would be interesting to see if that is true (the work of Awodey and Eliasson might be useful
here [6, 2]).
In the intuitionistic context SAT is again quite weak. Indeed, if LEMint is the Law of Excluded
Middle for internal formulas, then H + LEMint proves the finite axiom of choice for sequences
by Lemma 3.4 and SAT by the argument in Theorem 3.5. Since H+LEMint is conservative over
E-PA
ω by the main result of [4], this shows that H + SAT, E-PAω and E-HAω have the same
proof-theoretic strength. But we were unable to answer the questions whether SAT is provable
in H and whether H+ SAT is a conservative extension of E-HAω.
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